

Message Text

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R 110953Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2756
CINCPAC
INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 7061

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PK, US, MASS
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FOR FY 1979

REF: STATE 133136

1. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO REFTEL HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH
ALL CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM.

2. US FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA ARE BEST
SERVED BY STABILITY AND A LACK OF CONFLICT IN THE REGION.
A CENTRAL ELEMENT IN THIS EQUATION IS PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION
OF ITS OWN SECURITY AND DEFENSIVE NEEDS. IF PAKISTAN HAS
A MOBILE, MODERN DEFENSIVE FORCE, ONE WHICH CAN DEFEND
THE COUNTRY FOR UP TO SEVERAL WEEKS AGAINST AN INDIAN
ATTACK, THE GOP'S SENSE OF SECURITY AND THE STABILITY
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OF THE COUNTRY AND THE AREA WILL BE ENHANCED.

3. PAKISTAN SEES INDIA, WITH WHOM IT HAS HAD THREE WARS
IN THIRTY YEARS, AS ITS PRIMARY MILITARY THREAT.
AFGHANISTAN WITH WHOM IT HAS HAD A LONG-STANDING BORDER
DISPUTE, IS A SECONDARY THREAT. IN A BROADER SENSE,
PAKISTAN SEES THE SOVIET UNION - WITH DESIGNS ON A WARM

WATER PORT - WORKING THROUGH INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN AS SURROGATES TO DESTABILIZE AND EVENTUALLY DISMEMBER PAKISTAN. THE GOP SEES A STEADILY GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN ITS OWN AND INDIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH WITH A CONCOMITANT INCREASE IN PAKISTAN'S DEFENSIVE CONCERNS.

4. A LIMITED SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN, WHICH EMPHASIZES HELPING THE GOP TO MEET ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS, WILL ENHANCE REGIONAL SECURITY AND THEREFORE SUPPLEMENT OUR OWN FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. WE ALSO WANT TO PREVENT ANY INCREMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA AND BELIEVE THIS AIM IS BEST SERVED BY STABILITY IN THE AREA. A REASONABLE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL ALSO INCREASE THE SENSE OF SECURITY AND STABILITY WITHIN PAKISTAN ITSELF, THUS IMPROVING THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH A REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT CAN FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY. OUR OBJECTIVE, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE TO HAVE THE KIND OF MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN OUTLINED IN OUR SOUTH ASIA ARMS SUPPLY POLICY OF FEBRUARY 1975, AND THE PRESIDENT'S RECENTLY ENUNCIATED ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, WHICH ENVISIONS US PLAYING A MODERATE, REASONED ROLE IN MILITARY SUPPLY TO THE REGION.

5. OUR OWN VIEWS ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN ARE OBVIOUSLY AFFECTED BY RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS IN COUNTRY. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
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ON MILITARY SUPPLY ARE BEING CONSIDERED IN OTHER MESSAGES AND AS PART OF OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO GENERAL ZIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT IN ISLAMABAD. IN GENERAL, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE CONTINUE TO FOLLOW OUR ESTABLISHED POLICY UNDER WHICH WE DO NOT SELL MAJOR OFFENSIVE EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN NOR BECOME THE PRIMARY ARMS SUPPLIER TO THE AREA, BUT ARE FORTHCOMING IN MEETING THE COUNTRY'S LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS. LIKEWISE, THE MODEST IMET PROGRAM SHOULD BE CONTINUED, AND INCREASED IF POSSIBLE, REFLECTING THE CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT WE GAIN FROM HAVING PAKISTAN MILITARY OFFICERS TAKE ADVANCED PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES.

6. THE FOLLOWING ARE KEYED TO THE LETTERED SECTIONS OF
PARA 4 REFTEL.

A. AS NOTED ABOVE, PAKISTAN SEES INDIA, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT AFGHANISTAN, AS THE PRINCIPAL IMMEDIATE THREAT. THE GOP IS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION'S LONG-TERM INTENTIONS IN THE AREA. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW IS NOT VIEWED AS AN IMMEDIATE DIRECT MILITARY THREAT, THE GOP BELIEVES THAT INDIAN AND AFGHAN MILITARY

CAPABILITIES ARE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED THROUGH THE SUPPLY OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ADVICE. PAKISTAN SEES THE MILITARY DISPARITY BETWEEN ITSELF AND NEW DELHI CONTINUING TO INCREASE. AS INDIA'S INDUSTRIAL BASE GROWS AND ITS INDIGENOUS ARMS INDUSTRY CONTINUES TO MUSHROOM, THE GOP SEES THE GAP BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES QUICKLY WIDENING.

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PAKISTAN BELIEVES THE BEST POLITICAL STRATEGY TO MEET THE INDIAN THREAT IS TO ATTEMPT TO CONTINUE THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WITH DELHI ENVISIONED UNDER THE SIMLA ACCORD. ALSO, THE PRESENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP WANTS TO RETURN POWER TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AFTER ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER REALIZING THAT THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF PAKISTAN DEPENDS ON A POPULARLY ELECTED, RESPONSIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

DIPLOMATICALLY, OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS, THE GOP HAS INCREASINGLY TURNED TO THE THIRD WORLD AND ITS FELLOW ISLAMIC STATES, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, FOR SUPPORT. IT HAS CONTINUED ITS TRADITIONALLY CLOSE TIES WITH THE PRC. THE GOP BELIEVES IT NEEDS THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF OTHERS SUCH AS IRAN AND THE PRC AS SECURITY AGAINST WHAT IT PERCEIVES AS THE

INDIAN THREAT.

PAKISTAN'S MILITARY STRATEGY IS TO HAVE SUFFICIENT
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DEFENSIVE FORCES TO BLUNT AN INDIAN ATTACK FOR SEVERAL WEEKS
UNTIL INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE CAN STOP THE HOSTILITIES. THE GOP'S CONSEQUENT MILITARY STRATEGY IS TO STRENGTHEN
ITS MAJOR DEFENSIVE NEEDS, I.E. AIR DEFENSE, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, COASTAL WATER DEFENSE AND SURFACE
TO SURFACE MISSILE DEFENSE.

THE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY THREAT TO PAKISTAN
CORRESPONDS WITH THE GOP'S IN KIND ALTHOUGH NOT IN INTENSITY.
WE BELIEVE THE MOST PROBABLE POINT OF CONFLICT IS WITH INDIA. WE
DO NOT BELIEVE THAT INDIA'S PRESENT INTENTIONS ARE AS MALEVOLENT
AS THE GOP BELIEVES. HOWEVER, ISLAMABAD SEES ITS RELATIONS
WITH DELHI THROUGH THE PRISM OF THREE WARS AND CONTINUAL
ANIMOSITY. WE BELIEVE PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL STRATEGY OF NORMALIZING
TIES WITH INDIA AND STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AT
HOME, THE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY OF LOOKING TO ITS MUSLIM BROTHERS
AND THE PRC FOR SUPPORT, AND THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF EMPHASIZING
ITS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY ARE ALL SOUND AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

B. NOT APPLICABLE.

C. THE GOP BELIEVES FORCE MOBILITY PLUS DEFENSIVE FIRE POWER
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR A VIABLE SECURITY FORCE. BECAUSE OF THE PREPONDERANCE
OF INDIA'S ARMED FORCES (R.1 RATIO IN MANPOWER AGAINST PAKISTAN)
INDIA'S SUPERIOR AIR FORCE INCLUDING MODERN FIGHTER-INTERCEPTORS,
AND INDIA'S VASTLY OVERWHELMING NAVY, WITH AN INDIGENOUS SHIP BUILDING
CAPABILITY, THE PAKISTAN MILITARY BELIEVES IT MUST BE ABLE TO MOVE
QUICKLY AND CONCENTRATE ITS INFERIOR COMBAT FORCES. IT THEREFORE
WANTS TO BUILD A MODERN MOBILE DEFENSIVE FORCE. WE BELIEVE THIS IS
AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE NATION'S NEEDS. WE BELIEVE ANY
ALTERNATIVES TO A RELATIVELY SMALL BUT MODERN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT,
ONE PLAYING A PURELY DEFENSIVE ROLE, WOULD BE MORE COSTLY AND
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POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING.

D.

PRIORITY 1: TRAINING UNDER IMET WHICH IS CURRENTLY PROGRAMMED
FOR \$0.6 MILLION (SEE PARA 4K BELOW).

PRIORITY 2: FOLLOW-ON LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE TWO GEARING CLASS DESTROYERS ACQUIRED IN FY 77 INCLUDING AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN INSTALLED EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS - TOTAL \$2.0 MILLION, FMS CASH.

PRIORITY 3: AIRCRAFT - FOUR C-130 CARGO AIRCRAFT - TOTAL \$32.0 MILLION, FMS CASH. AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT INTERNAL AERIAL LOGISTICS NETWORK, TROOP SUPPORT AND DISASTER RELIEF. CONSIDERING COMMONALITY OF CURRENT EQUIPMENT, LESS COSTLY ALTERNATIVE OR SUBSTITUTE ITEM NOT MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE.

PRIORITY 4: TWO GEARING CLASS DESTROYERS ESTIMATED TO COST \$0.5 MILLION, FMS CASH. OUR INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED IF THE PAK NAVY DEVELOPS A VIABLE BUT LIMITED ASW CAPABILITY BY REPLACING OBSOLETE EX-BRITISH DESTROYERS. THE PAK NAVY WANTS A CAPABILITY TO DEFEND PAKISTAN AGAINST THE INDIAN SUBMARINE THREAT AND TO PROTECT ITS COSTLINES AND ONE PORT - KARACHI. LESS ADVANCE/COSTLY ALTERNATIVES WOULD NOT ALLOW THE NAVY TO FULFILL ITS ALREADY LIMITED ROLE.

PRIORITY 5: FOLLOW-ON LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE TWO DESTROYERS IN PRIORITY FOUR ABOVE INCLUDING SPARE PARTS, REPAIRS, AMMUNITION AND ANTI-SUBMARINE ROCKETS (ASROC) FOR TOTAL COST OF \$11.0 MILLION, FMS CASH. RATIONALE PROVIDED IN PRIORITY FOUR APPLIES.

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PRIORITY 6: WHEELED VEHICLES OF VARIOUS SIZES/PURPOSES ESTIMATED TO COST \$12.0 MILLION, FMS CASH. PAK ARMY WILL USE THESE VEHICLES TO REPLACE OBSOLETE/WORN OUT VEHICLES IN CURRENT INVENTORY THEREBY INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND REDUCING MAINTENANCE COST. THERE ARE NO LESS ADVANCED OR LESS COSTLY ALTERNATIVES IN THIS SPECIFIC CATEGORY.

PRIORITY 7: A WIDE VARIETY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ESTIMATED TO COST \$9.0 MILLION, FMS CASH. THESE RADIOS WOULD SERVE TO INCREASE THEIR COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY.

PRIORITY 8: MISCELLANEOUS FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT FOR BOTH NEW EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS AND FOR US ORIGIN EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN THEIR INVENTORY INCLUDING REPAIR PARTS, PUBLICATIONS, OVERHAUL, AND RELATED ITEMS NECESSARY TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THIS US ORIGIN EQUIPMENT FOR AN ESTIMATED TOTAL COST OF \$15 MILLION, FMS CASH.

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(IN LIGHT OF THE A-7 TURNDOWN, THE PAF IS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN F-5E PURCHASE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO INDICATION THE PAF IS PREPARING A REQUEST FOR AN LOA, ONE MAY BE FORTHCOMING SOMETIME DURING THIS COMING FY. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY AIRCRAFT THE PAF WOULD REQUEST, BUT ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE BASIS, WE UNDERSTAND THAT FIFTY F-5ES WOULD COST ABOUT \$200-250 MILLION, AND WOULD BE PURCHASED ON AN FMS BASIS.)

ALL OF THE ABOVE ITEMS, UNDER 1 THROUGH 8, ARE NON-CONTROVERSIAL AND UNEXCEPTIONAL. THE GOP'S PURPOSE IN PURCHASING THEM IS TO UPDATE ALREADY EXISTING SYSTEMS, ALL ARE ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE, AND ALL SUPPLEMENT SYSTEMS ALREADY PURCHASED FROM THE US. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO ASSIST PAKISTAN TO MODERNIZE ITS OBSOLETE DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT.

E. DEPENDING ON HOW MUCH OF THE PROCUREMENT LISTED UNDER PRIORITY 8 IS ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT, THE PROGRAM OUTLINED ABOVE COULD TOTAL FROM \$67 TO \$82 MILLION. AS INDICATED IN ISLAMABAD 6605, WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST SERIOUS IMPACT OF MILITARY SPENDING ON PAKISTAN'S ECONOMY IS THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BURDEN IT INVOLVES, TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS IS NOT OFFSET BY SOFT LOANS OR GRANTS. WE ESTIMATE THAT PAKISTAN'S TRADE DEFICIT IN FY 1979 WILL STILL BE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF \$1 BILLION. THE PROPOSED MILITARY PROCUREMENT REPRESENTS UNDER TEN PERCENT OF THAT TOTAL, AND A MUCH SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS. ANY ADDITION TO PAKISTAN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DRAIN OF COURSE REPRESENTS AN ADDED STRAIN TO THE ECONOMY, BUT GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE

OVERALL PROBLEM THE MILITARY SPENDING PORTION OF IT REPRESENTS
A RELATIVELY MINOR ASPECT.

F. NO US PERSONNEL WILL BE REQUIRED IN-COUNTRY SPECIFICALLY
TO IMPLEMENT THESE SALES. HOWEVER, WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE PAK
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NAVY WILL REQUEST AN ESTIMATED 200 MAN-DAYS OF USN TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE IN-COUNTRY TO ASSIST IN MAINTENANCE/REPAIR OF EQUIP-
MENT/SYSTEMS INSTALLED IN THE TWO DESTROYERS ACQUIRED IN FY
77. WE ANTICIPATE NO PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THAT MINOR ADDED
PRESENCE.

G. COMPARABLE KINDS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES ARE
AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, HOWEVER THE PAK MILITARY BELIEVES
THEY DO NOT HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY
AND COST/OPERATING EFFECTIVENESS AS US ORIGIN EQUIPMENT AND
SERVICES. PAKISTAN WOULD ACQUIRE THEM FROM OTHER SOURCES IF THE
US DENIES THEIR REQUEST.

H. WE FORESEE NO ARMS CONTROL IMPACT BECAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE
MODEST AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT NOTED ABOVE. SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN
THE REGION, INCLUDING INDIA, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND, OF COURSE
THE USSR AND THE PRC, HAVE COMPARABLE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT. INDIA
IS PAKISTAN'S MAIN CONCERN AND IN ALMOST EVERY CATEGORY OF MIL-
ITARY SUPPLY ITS QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF EQUIPMENT IS SUPERIOR TO
PAKISTAN'S.

I. THE IMPOSITION OF MILITARY RULE LAST WEEK WILL HAVE AN
IMPACT ON ATTITUDES IN THE STATES, WE BELIEVE, ONLY IF GENERAL
ZIA'S GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FOLLOW THROUGH ON ITS STATED INTENT TO
HAVE ELECTIONS AND TURN OVER POWER TO A FREELY ELECTED AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. OUR ASSESSMENT NOW IS THAT GENERAL
ZIA FULLY INTENDS TO HOLD NEW ELECTIONS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT
THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION HAS BEGUN RELEASING POLITICAL
PRISONERS ARRESTED BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. OVER THE MID-TERM,
UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS ARE HELD AND A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
TAKES POWER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE EITHER APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS WILL HAVE ANY IMPORTANT IMPACT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN.

J. IF AN EQUITABLE SYSTEM OF RESTRAINT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS INTO SOUTH ASIA COULD BE DEvised, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD
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HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE GOP. THE PAKISTAN MILITARY POINTS TO

INDIA'S GROWING INDIGENOUS ARMS INDUSTRY AND THE LARGE TRANSFERS OF ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO INDIA IN SUPPORT OF ITS CONTENTION THAT ITS REQUESTS FROM US ARE MINOR IN COMPARISON.

K. PROFESSIONAL AND ADVANCED CAREER DEVELOPMENT ALREADY RECEIVES THE MAJOR EMPHASIS OF OUR IMET PROGRAM WITH PAKISTAN. WE BELIEVE THIS REFLECTS WASHINGTON'S GOALS FOR THE IMET PROGRAM AND SERVES OUR INTERESTS AS WELL AS PAKISTAN'S. PAKISTAN IS ALREADY PURCHASING THE MAJORITY OF ITS EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING UNDER FMS RATHER THAN USING IMET FUNDING.

PAKISTAN PAYS ALL OVERSEAS TRAVEL AND ALLOWANCES FOR ITS PERSONNEL RECEIVING TRAINING IN THE STATES UNDER IMET. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT PAYMENT OF TRAVEL AND LIVING COSTS IN THE STATES ALSO BE PAID BY THE GOP, HOWEVER DUE TO FINANCIAL STRINGENCIES IN PAKISTAN, WE DOUBT THE GOP WILL ACCEPT THIS RECOMMENDATION.
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